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Davis: Landowner Liability under the Wyoming Recreational Use Statute

LANDOWNER LIABILITY UNDER THE
WYOMING RECREATIONAL USE STATUTE
If one were to ask any first year law student to describe
the historical nature of the liability of owners and occupiers
of land for injuries to persons entering thereon, and to
discuss trends in that area of the law, it's likely that he
would outline the three common law classifications of trespasser, licensee, and invitee, with corresponding duties of
care, and exceptions.' He would add, no doubt, that the trend
in a minority of jurisdictions is to abolish these classifications entirely and substitute a uniform standard of reasonable care under the circumstances,' or to at least abolish
the distinction between licensees and invitees and to require
ordinary care as to both.' A Wyoming student would probably tell you that the Wyoming courts have not followed
these trends, so that one still needs to concern himself with
these three classifications.
That answer would be at least three-fourths rightbut there is apparently another category which lawyers
representing plaintiffs and landowners in Wyoming and
elsewhere may need to be concerned with, legislatively
created in a majority of states. The legislation creates
what will be called, for lack of a better term, a recreational
user, and in certain cases lowers the standard of care to
which a landowner is held. The statute in Wyoming has
lain dormant since 1965, except for a single case. This
comment will discuss possible ramifications of this legislation, and examine judicial responses attempting to harmonize and limit a new classification superimposed on the
common law in opposition to a trend in the courts to expand
the landowner's liability for foreseeable harms. The statute should be of interest to those whose lands are open to
Copyright@ 1980 by the University of Wyoming

1.

PROSSER, TORTS 357-415 (4th Ed. 1971); DOOLEY, 1 MODERN TORT LAW
375-379 (1977).
2. See Annot., 32 A.L.R.3d 508 (1970), collecting early cases, including
Rowlands v. Christian, 69 Cal.2d 108, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561
(1968), the first case to do so. For a more recent collection of cases,
see Note, Premises Liability-New York Joins Minority of States Abolishing Trespasser, Licensee, Invitee Distinctions, 45 FORDHAm L. REV. 682
(1976).
3. See Note, Tort Liability of Owners and Possessors of Land-A Single
Standard of Reasonable Care Under The Circumstances Towards Invitees
and Licensees, 33 ARK. L. REV. 194 (1979).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1980

1

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 15 [1980], Iss. 2, Art. 9

650

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XV

the use of hunters, skiers, hikers, and other lovers of the
outdoors, but may nonetheless be of little practical significance, as will be seen.
I.

THE RECREATIONAL USE ACT

The Wyoming legislation is to be found at Sections
34-19-101 through 106. A discussion of the Act's history,
purpose, and structure is in order.
A.

History and Purpose

There appear to be forty-two jurisdictions which have
adopted what will be called Recreational Use Acts.4 They
vary somewhat, but seem to trace their origins to a Wisconsin statute enacted in 1963.' The Wisconsin statute came
about because of the problems experienced by foresters with
destruction of trees by deer. To solve this problem, they
invited hunters to hunt on their lands, but feared liability
for negligent maintenance of narrow logging roads and
other facilities. For this reason, the foresters were able to
persuade the Wisconsin Legislature to pass a recreational
use act to limit their potential liability.6
The reason currently given for adoption of these statutes elsewhere is a legislative desire to encourage landowners to open their lands to the public for recreational
use by limiting their civil liability for doing so.' This policy
was the motive force behind a Model Act developed by the
Committee of State Officials on Suggested State Legislation
of the Council of State Governments 8 This Model Act was
4. Barrett, Good Sports and Bad Lands: The Application of Washington's
Recreational Use Statute Limiting Landowner Liability, 53 WASH. L. REV.
1, 2 fn. 10 (1977) lists forty-one, while Judge Renfrew in Gard v. United
States, 420 F. Supp. 300, 302 (N.D.Cal. 1976) refers to forty-three.
Barrett's list does not include the Colorado statute, COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 33-41-101 et. seq. (1973). Judge Renfrew may have. counted UTAH CODE
ANN. § 23-1-13 et. seq. (1967 Supp.), repealed in 1971.
5. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 29.68 (1973).
6. Goodson v. City of Racine, 61 Wis.2d:554, 213 .N.W.2d 16, 19 (1973) and
Note, Liability of Landowners to. Persons Entering for Recreational Purposes, 1964 Wis. L.- REV. 705, 709 (1964).
7. See, e.g., English v. Marin Municipal Water District,"66 Cal. App.3d 725,
136 Cal. Rptr. 224, 228 (1977), Barrett, supra note 4, at 4.
8. COMMITTEE OF STATE OFFICIALS ON SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION, XXIV
SUGGESTED STATE'LEGISLATION 150-152 (1975). The policy preamble states:
Recent years have seen a growing awareness of the need for
additional recreational areas to serve the general public. The
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adopted verbatim by the Wyoming Legislature in 1965, 0
except that the first section of the Act, stating its purpose,
was not enacted.'" The inference would be, then, that the
Wyoming Legislature adopted the Act for the reasons the
Model Act was promulgated.
Statutes of this kind" have been held constitutional
against equal protection challenges as rationally related to
the valid state purpose of opening private lands for use by
the public.1" The attacks have relied on cases striking down
automobile guest statutes limiting liability to passengers to
cases of gross negligence. The courts have found a closer
relationship between the recreational use statutes and their
classifications than those of guest statutes.13
B.

Structure of the Act

The Wyoming Recreational Use Act limits the duty of
an owner 4 to persons using his land' 5 for recreational

9.
10.

11.
12.

13.

14.
15.

acquisition and operation of outdoor recreational facilities by
governmental units is on the increase. However, large acreages
of private land could add to the outdoor recreation resources
available . . . in those instances where private owners are
willing to make their land available to members of the general
public without charge, it is possible to argue that every reasonable
encouragement should be given to them.
1965 WYO. SESs. LAws Ch. 9.
Section One of the Model Act reads, "The purpose of this Act is to
encourage owners of land to make land and water areas available to the
public for recreational purposes by limiting their liability toward persons
entering thereon for such purposes." SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION, 87pra,
at 150. Some states have enacted the statement of purposes; e.g., ILL. ANN.
STAT. Ch. 70, § 31 (1979 Supp.). Others have deleted this section as
Wyoming did; e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2795 (1979 Supp.).
Including those not based on the Model Act.
Parish v. Lloyd, 82 Cal. App.3d 785, 147 Cal. Rptr. 431, 432 (1978) and
Lostritto v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 73 Cal. App.3d 737, 140 Cal. Rptr.
905, 910-911 (1977), upholding CAL. CiV. CODE § 846 (West Supp. 1979);
and Estate of Thomas v. Consumers Power Co., 58 Mich. App. 486, 228
N.W.2d 786, 792 (1975), upholding MIcH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 300.201
(Supp. 1979).
See, e.g., Parish v. Lloyd, supra note 12, at 432, distinguishing Brown v.
Merlo, 8 Cal.3d 855, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388, 506 P.2d 212 (1973), which had
found the California automobile guest statute violative of the state and
federal equal protection clauses, on the ground that the classification
created by the guest statute did not serve its ostensible purpose. Cf.
Nehring v. Russell, 582 P.2d 67, 77-80 (Wyo. 1978), holding the Wyoming
guest statute violative of WYO. CONST. art. 1, § 34, requiring laws to be
of uniform operation.
As defined in WYO. STAT. § 34-19-101 (a) (ii) (1977), "the possessor of a
fee interest, a tenant, lessee, occupant, or person in control of the premises."
Defined by Wyo. STAT. § 34-19-101 (a) (i) (1977) to be "land, roads, water,
watercourses, private ways and buildings, structures, and machinery or
equipment when attached to the realty."
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purposes16 in two ways. First, the statute directs that
except as otherwise provided in the Act, the owner owes
no duty of care to keep the premises safe or to warn of a
dangerous condition, use, structure or activity on his
premises to persons using the land for recreational purposes.'" Secondly, an owner who directly or indirectly invites a person to use his property for recreational purposes
doesn't extend any assurance of safety, confer legal status
as a licensee or invitee, or assume responsibility for any
injury to users caused by other recreational users." The
Act thus places invitees, licensees, and trespassers on the
same footing if they are recreational users, and eliminates
the need for an inquiry into the owner's consent or lack
of it. 9
The Act excepts two classes of cases from its operation,
even when the use is recreational." ° The Act does not limit
liability for a willful or malicious failure to guard against
a dangerous condition, structure, or activity, 1 nor does it
limit the liability of an owner who charges22 for the recreational use of his land, excluding from this exception lease
fees paid by the state.23
The Act creates no duty of care, nor does it relieve the
user of land for recreational purposes of any duty to use
due care.2 4 The Act applies to an owner of land leased to
the state, unless otherwise provided in writing."
The effect of the Act, in summary, is to relieve an
owner of land of any duty of care to persons using it for
16. WYO. STAT. § 34-19-101 (a) (iii) (1977) defined as including, but not limited
to "any of the following, or any combination thereof: hunting, fishing,
swimming, boating, camping, picnicking, hiking, pleasure driving, nature
study, water skiing, winter sports, and viewing or enjoying historical,
archeological, scenic, or scientific sites."
17. WYO. STAT. § 34-19-102 (1977).
18. WYO. STAT. § 34-19-103 (1977).
19. Barrett, Good Sports and Bad Lands, supra note 4, at 3.
20. WYO. STAT. § 34-19-105 (1977).
21. WYO. STAT. § 34-19-105(a) (i) (1977). Such a limitation would no doubt
have been implied as a matter of public policy.
22. Defined by WYo. STAT. § 34-19-101 (a) (iv) (1977) as "the admission price
or fee asked in return for invitation or permission to enter or go upon the
land."
23. WYO. STAT. § 34-19-105(a) (ii) (1977).
24. WYO. STAT. § 34-19-106 (1977).
25. WYO. STAT. § 34-19-104 (1977).
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recreational purposes, unless he charges for use of the land,
or his acts are willful or malicious.
II.

28
WYOMING LAW OF OWNERS AND OCCUPIERS
PRIOR TO ENACTMENT

Before attempting to assess the impact, if any, of the
Wyoming Recreational Use Act on the landowner's duty of
care in Wyoming, it is necessary to first determine what
that duty was. The courts of Wyoming, like those of most
states,27 have historically drawn on the three common law
categories of trespasser, licensee, and invitee to determine
duties owed by a landowner to persons on his land. 8 Recent
cases show little inclination to depart from that analysis, "
unless the recent case striking down the Wyoming automobile guest statutes could be taken as a precursor of an
intent to abolish the distinction between licensees and invitees by analogy."0
The first problem in applying the categories is, of
course, to decide whether a particular plaintiff is a trespasser, licensee, or invitee. The term "trespasser" does not
appear to be expressly defined in the Wyoming cases, but
there can be little doubt that the term is used as it commonly
is to indicate "a person who enters or remains upon land
in the possession of another without a privilege to do so
created by the possessor's consent or otherwise." 1 A licensee,
although not clearly defined in Wyoming law, appears be
defined, also as he commonly is, to be one who "is privileged
3 2to enter or remain on land only by the possessor's consent.
One might expect a great deal of litigation over the
existence or absence of consent in a given case and whether,
26. The term "owner" or "landowner" will be used indiscriminately to refer
to owners and occupiers, except as otherwise indicated.
27. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 351, DooLEY, supra note 1, at 375-377.
28. Loney v. Laramie Auto Co., 36 Wyo. 339, 255 P. 350 (1927), and Maher v.
City of Casper. 67 Wyo. 268, 219 P.2d 125, 128-129 (1950).
29. Bluejacket v. Carney, 550 P.2d 494 (Wyo. 1976), and Sinclair Refining
Company v. Redding, 439 P.2d 20 (Wyo. 1968), for example, rely on these
categories without discussion of possible change.
30. Nehring v. Russell, supra note 13.
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 329 (1965). To the same effect, see
PROSSER, supra note 1, at 357, DOOLEY, supra note 1, at 379.
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 330 (1965), PROSSER, supra note 1, at
376, DOOLEY, supra note 1, at 381.
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therefore, a given plaintiff is a trespasser or a licensee.
This has not been the case, however, because the duty as
to both is nearly identical. In Maher v. City of Casper, the
Wyoming Supreme Court (per Justice Blume) held that
the only duty owed to a trespasser or a licensee is to refrain
from wantonly injuring him." The sole difference, as to a
licensee, appears to be that an owner has a duty to warn
as to dangers in the nature of a trap."'
The important distinction is that between an invitee
and a licensee. The proper definition of an invitee is a
question which has divided the courts. The first and minority
group holds that a potential economic benefit to the plaintiff is the test of invitee status."5 The second and majority
test is whether the owner has opened his property to the
public, and if so whether he's represented that the premises
are safe to his visitors. Wyoming, in name at least, utilized
the economic benefit test in Sinclair Refining Company v.
Redding." However, the court clearly stretched the test
beyond any real requirement of a possible economic benefit,
for it held that the plaintiff, who was injured while using
service station restroom facilities without a purchase of
gasoline, might perhaps purchase fuel on the return trip."
It thus seems that any potential benefit would suffice to
constitute a person an invitee, to whom the owner will owe
a duty to use reasonable care. 9
The plaintiff's chief obstacle in Wyoming, then, has
been to prove himself an invitee, or alternatively to show
that he was wantonly injured by the defendant."0
33. Supra note 28, at 129. The language referred to speaks of municipal corporations, but the cases discussed do not rely on that distinction.
34. Loney v. Laramie.Auto Co., supra note 28, at 351.
35. PROSSER, sura note 1, at 386, and RESTATEMENT (FiRST) OF TORTS §§ 332,
343 (1934). See Rickey v. Kemper, 392 S.W.2d 266, 268 (Mo. 1963) for an
example.
36. PROSSER, supia note 1, at 388, DOOLEY, supra note 1, at 384.
37. 439 P.2d 20, 23 (Wyo. 1968).
8. Id. The court held that these facts raised a jury question, not that the
plaintiff was an invitee as a matter of law.
39. Loney v. Laramie Auto Co., supra note 28, at 351.
40. The Wyoming cases do not appear to distinguish between a duty of a
care as to conditions and that as to activities carried on upon the land,
as some courts do, as to licensees. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 379.
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III.
A.

EFFECT OF THE RECREATIONAL USE ACT

Interpretation

To date, only one case has been reported under the
Wyoming Recreational Use Act, and that in the federal
district court for Wyoming.41 As a result, the possible
effects of the Act are speculative. However, there are a
substantial number of cases in other states with similar
or identical statutes which should offer some guidance.
The first problem that courts have encountered is the
conceptual one of deciding what effect the Acts were intended to have on the common law. If in derogation of the
common law, then the Acts must be strictly construed.

"

If the Acts merely codify or restate prior law, then they
may be read more liberally." In Alabama, this decision was
made by the legislature by proclaiming an intent to clarify
the common law in the Act." Some courts have reached the
same conclusion without the benefit of legislative guidance,
holding that the statutes were intended merely to preserve
the common law against more liberal approaches.4" Others
have reached the opposite conclusion, finding the statutes
to alter the common law."
41. Smith v. United States, 383 F. Supp. 1076 (D.Wyo. 1974). The plaintiff
was injured in a fall into an unmarked hot pool in Yellowstone Park. The
application of the Recreational Use Act is interesting for reasons discussed
infra, and resulted in judgment for the defendant. In Smith v. United
States, 546 F.2d 872 (10th Cir. 1976). the court of appeals upheld the
verdict on the basis of contributory negligence. The case predated the
effective date of the Wyoming Comparative Negligence Act, Wyo. STAT.
§1-1-109 (1977).
42.

SUTHERLAND, 3 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 41

(4th Ed. 1974).

43. Estate of Thomas v. Consumers Power Co., supra note 12, at 789. "[Tlhis
statute does not change the common-law duty of owners and occupiers of
property owed to those who come upon such property as mere licensees, as
were the plaintiffs in this case. The Act is merely a codification of tort
principles which are universally recognized at common law." The Michigan
Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 300.201 (Supp. 1979) is not based on the
Model Act.
44. 1965 Ala. Acts, Act No. 463, § 3. See Wright v. Alabama Power Co., 355
So.2d 322, 323 (Ala. 1978).
45. Estate of Thomas v. Consumers Power Co., supra note 12, at 789, and
Rock v. Concrete Materials, Inc., 46 A.D.2d 300, 362 N.Y.S.2d 258, 260
(1974), app. dism. 36 N.Y.2d 772, 368 N.Y.S.2d 841, 329 N.E.2d 672
(1975). The New York statute does not adopt the format of the Model
Act, but is quite similar. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 9-103 (McKinney Supp.
1979).
46. Boileau v. DeCecco, 125 N.J. Super. 263, 310 A.2d 497, 500 (1973), and
Goodson v. City of Racine,. supra note 6, at 18.
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The resolution of this question will necessarily turn
on the state of the common law in the jurisdiction in question, and the precise language of the applicable statute. As
seen above, Maher v. City of Casper" indicates that the only
duty owed to a trespasser or licensee is to avoid wantonly
injuring him. To the extent that the Recreational Use Act
applies to persons who were classified as trespassers or
licensees under common law,"8 the statute's clause reserving
situations involving willful or malicious acts" from its
operation seems to preserve the common law."
The significant change is in the invitee classification.
In Sinclair Refining Company v. Redding,5 the court extended invitee status in a situation involving a very attenuated possibility of economic benefit. However, the Recreational Use Act, limiting liability to willful or malicious
harms, applies to any person using the land for a recreational
purpose unless the owner charges for admission.52 The
definition of charge in the statute is an "admission price
or fee asked in return for invitation or permission to go
upon the land.""3 To the extent one who would otherwise
be an invitee is a recreational user under the Act, he is
only exempt from its limitations if he has paid a charge.
For example, suppose that a developer of mountain real
estate made available a campground in the hope of attracting
potential buyers and exposing them to his property. Under
Sinclair Refining, the campers would probably be invitees.
However, if the developer didn't charge a camping fee, the
Act would apply, redefining the developer's liability to that
for willful or malicious acts.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Supra note 28.
WYO. STAT. §§ 34-19-102 and 34-19-103 (1977).
WYO. STAT. § 34-19-105 (1977).
There appears to be no Wyoming case defining the term wanton. Generally,
however, willful, wanton, and reckless conduct seem to be defined to require a knowledge of danger to others and at least an indifference to that
danger. See, e.g., Byers v. Hesston Appliance, Inc., 212 Kan. 125, 509 P.2d
1151, 1154 (1973); Storckman v. Keller, 143 Ind. App. 43, 237 N.E.2d 602,
603 (1968). The problem of how the term "willful" is defined bears on
this issue, and is more fully discussed below.
51. Supra note 29.
52. WYO. STAT. § 34-19-105 (1977).
53. WYO. STAT. § 34-19-101 (a) (iv) (1977), supra note 22.
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If this is true, then the statute alters prior law as to
invitees, and modifies the common law. The significance of
this would be in the judicial approach to application of the
statute in doubtful cases, as will be seen below.
B.

Lands Under the Act

By its terms, the Wyoming statute applies to "lands,
roads, water, watercourses, private ways and buildings,
structures, and machinery or equipment when attached to
' The statute contains no express limitation as
the realty."54
to realty, wherever located, and could conceivably apply
anywhere that a use constituting a recreational purpose
under the Act could be carried on. Courts in other jurisdictions, however, have been unwilling to apply the Recreational Use Acts to limit liability on the kinds of lands not
within purposes contemplated by the legislature in passing
the Acts. For example, in Shepard v. Wilson," a Georgia
Court of Appeals refused to apply the Georgia Act (identical to that of Wyoming) to a case in which a child was
burned by hot coals left on a vacant lot owned by the
defendant, located in an urban area. The court held that
"to say that the statute would apply to a vacant lot in a
residential area under the facts of this case ' 'would extend
its coverage far beyond its intended purpose.
The New Jersey courts have also refused to apply that
57
state's act to residential areas. In Boileau v. De Cecco,
the court construed an amendment of the applicable statute 8 from "agricultural lands" to "premises" narrowly so
as not to "enlarge the protected class of homeowners to
suburbia."" The court relied on the strict reading to be
given a statute in derogation of common law.6" An earlier
case relied on in Boileau had held that the statute merely
54. WYO. STAT. § 34-19-101(a) (i) (1977), supra note 15.
55. 123 Ga. App. 74, 179 S.E.2d 550 (1970), construing GA. CODE ANN. §§ 105403 to 406 (1968 Rev.).
56. Id., at 551.
57. Supra note 46. It should be noted that the New Jersey courts have been
quite vigorous in limiting the scope of that state's Recreational Use Act.
58. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A-42A-2 through 4 (West Supp. 1979).
59. Boileau v. Shepard, supra note 46, at 500.
60. Id.
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stated a rule of reasonableness as to landowners' liability,
in seeming conflict.61 Later New Jersey cases have applied
a test relying on the nature of the property and its use, as
opposed to mere location.6"
Another basis for refusing to apply a recreational use
statute is a limitation on access. For example, in Herring v.
Hauck, a Georgia case, the court held the Act inapplicable
to a private swimming pool because the pool was not open
to the public, but merely to specific individuals."3 The same
reasoning has led to exemption from the New Jersey Act
in that state.
Other limitations may be found in express statutory
limitations not enacted in Wyoming, or in implied exceptions. In Miller v. United States,6 a federal district court
held that persons or agencies subject to the Illinois Recreational Area Licensing Act 7 were not entitled to the protection of the Illinois Recreational Use Act. 8 The suit was
against the United States, which the court found would
be subject to the former Act if a private individual, and
concluded that the two statutes created a scheme whereby
a facility must fall under one or the other. 9
A related question is whether Recreational Use Acts
apply to lands owned by federal, state, and local governments. Section 34-19-104 of the Wyoming Statutes causes
it to apply to lands leased to the state, but makes no
specific reference to lands owned in fee by the state or local
governments. This does not present a problem in suits
against the United States, since the Federal Tort Claims
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Scheck v. Houdaille Construction Materials, Inc., 121 N.J. Super. 335, 297
A.2d 17, 21 (1972).
Harrison v. Middlesex Water Co., 158 N.J. Super. 368, 386 A.2d 405, 412
(1978). "[T]he key factors, must be the activity and the kind of property
and use to which it is put."
118 Ga. App. 623, 165 S.E.2d 198, 199 (1968).
Harrison v. Middlesex Water Co., supra note 62, at 411.
E.g., WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.210 (Supp. 1978).
1976).
442 F. Supp. 555 (N.D.Ill.
1
ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 111 Y, §§ 761 to 785 (Smith-Hurd 1977).
ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 70, §§ 31 to 37 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979).
Miller v. United States, supra note 66, at 561.
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Act specifically applies when a private individual would
be liable."0
One court has refused to find local government lands
subject to a Recreational Use Act when the Act was passed
before sovereign immunity was abrogated. In Anderson v.
Brown Brothers, Inc., 1 the defendant was a lessee from a
city, excavating gravel from an area adjacent to a city park.
The plaintiff was injured when he dove off a diving board
into the shallow water of the quarry. The court held that
the statute was not intended to apply to land used for
governmental functions, as a common law tort immunity
existed at that time, and that the legislature couldn't have
intended a double exemption. The statute therefore did not
apply to the municipality or its lessee. 2
The same reasoning could be applied in Wyoming
because of the status of tort immunity of the state and
municipalities at the time the Recreational Use Act was
passed in 1965. Municipal immunity was abrogated in
Oroz v. Board of County Commissioners,7 decided in 1978.
The Wyoming Governmental Claims Act passed in response
to that decision in 1979 specifically reserves all common
law defenses to suits in tort, but does not speak to the issue
of a prior statutory defense."4 The Act does subject governmental entities to liabilities for negligent operation or maintenance of buildings, recreation areas, or parks. 5
Another judicial method of limiting these statutes is
to restrict them to their purpose-to encourage private
landowners to open their lands for recreational use. In
Goodson v. City of Racine, 6 the Wisconsin court found the
28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976), Miller v. United States, supra note 66, at 561.
65 Mich. App. 409, 237 N.W.2d 528 (1975).
Id., at 531-532.
Oroz v. Board of County Commissioners of Carbon County, 575 P.2d 1155
(Wyo. 1978). See also Note, 14 LAND & WATER L. REv. 271 (1979).
74. WYO. STAT. § 1-39-102 (1977).
75. WYO. STAT. § 1-39-106 (1977). For a more complete treatment of the
Governmental Claims Act, see Comment, Wyoming's Governmental Claims
Act-A Statutory Analysis, 15 LAND & WATER L. REv. 619 (1980).
76. Supra note 6, at 19. The Wisconsin act applies to "premises," defined as
"lands, private ways, and any buildings, structures or improvements thereon." Wis. STAT. ANN. § 29.68 (West 1973).
70.
71.
72.
73.
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statute inapplicable to publicly owned lands for that reason.
Other states, however, have held their respective statutes
applicable to state and municipal lands expressly or implicity.7"
C.

Entrants to Whom the Act Applies.

The test for determining whether the Wyoming Recreational Use Act applies, in addition to the problems discussed
above, is whether the use or intended use falls within the
definition of recreational purpose, which is as follows:
"Recreational purpose" includes, but is not limited
to, any of the following, or any combination thereof:
hunting, fishing, swimming, boating, camping, picnicking, hiking, pleasure driving, nature study,
water skiing, winter sports, and viewing or enjoying historical, archeological, scenic or scientific
sites."8
It is obvious that the Act could reach any type of outdoor activity, and this has been held to be the limitation on
the scope of the Act by one court. In Villanova v. Amercian
Federation of Musicians," a New Jersey appellate court
refused to apply the New Jersey Act to a musician injured
in a county park while preparing to give a free concert.
The court relied on the principle of ejusdem generis to the
statute, and found its scope limited to physical activities
requiring the outdoors, wholly excluding spectator sports.8"
A problem which has troubled the courts is the application of the doctrine of attractive nuisance to uses covered
by the statute." Some statutes expressly reserve the operation of that doctrine from the statute.2 Courts applying
statutes without such limitations, like that of Wyoming,
have reached inconsistent results. Some hold simply that
77. See, e.g., Diodato v. Camden County Park Commission, 162 N.J. Super.
275, 392 A.2d 665 (1978), and Trimblett v. State, 156 N.J. Super. 291,
383 A.2d 1146 (1977). In Trimblett, the court relied on a reservation of
private remedies to the state in its Tort Claims Act.
78. WYO. STAT. § 34-19-101 (a) (iii) (1977), supra note 16.
79. 123 N.J. Super. 57, 301 A.2d 467 (1973).
80. Id. at 469.
81. DOOLEY, supra note 1, at 259.
82. See, e.g., S. D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 20-9-5 (1979).
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since there is no specific exception from the Act, it must
have been intended to apply to children.83 The New Jersey
courts have reversed this reasoning, holding that since such
a statute is in derogation of common law, it must be strictly
construed not to apply to children without expressly so
providing. 4 These issues may be moot in Wyoming, where
the doctrine of attractive nuisance has not been accepted
or rejected.8"
An alternative method for avoiding the Act in the
case of children is to hold that since the intent of the child
in entering the land is crucial to determining if the entry
was for a recreational purpose, it is a jury question of fact
as to whether the child was old enough to and had formed
the requisite intent. 6
Still another problem with entrants has been the
situation of rescuers. In Odar v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
a New Jersey court held that a rescuer who had entered
the land of the defendant to rescue his daughter after she
fell through the ice was within the Act, and that no liability
could arise to a foreseeable rescuer unless the defendant
was responsible for willfully causing the original accident.87
This creates an awkward policy situation. It seems fair
and desirable that a user of private land must take his
chances thereon. It does not seem so fair or desirable that
a rescuer should be faced with risks when he attempts to
render aid, at least if he is not associated with a recreational user in any way.
D.

Conditions to Which the Act Applies

The Wyoming Recreational Use Act literally applies
to "a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity."88
83. Heider v. Michigan Sugar Company, 375 Mich. App. 490, 134 N.W.2d 637,
643 (1965), followed in Magerowski v. Standard Oil Company, 274 F. Supp.
246, 247 (W.D.Mich. 1967). The same rule was applied in Blair v. United
States, 433 F. Supp. 217 (D.Nev. 1977).
84. Scheck v. Houdaille Construction Co., supra note 60, at 22, and O'Connel v.
Forest Hill Field Club, 119 N.J. Super. 317, 291 A.2d 386, 389 (1972).
85. Maher v. City of Casper, supra note 28.
86. Scheck v. Houdaille Construction Co., supra note 61, at 20.
87. Odar v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 138 N.J. Super. 464, 351 A.2d 389, 392
(1976).
88. WYO. STAT. § 34-19-102 (1977).
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On its face, the Act does not distinguish between artificial
and natural conditions, and some courts have not made such
a distinction.89 However, the New Jersey courts, despite the
absence of any specific statutory language which would
support such a distinction," have found the New Jersey Act
not to apply to artificial conditions. In Diodato v. Camden
County Park Commissioners,"' the plaintiff dove into a
river from the banks of land owned by the defendant city
and struck a submerged barrel, breaking his neck. The
court held that the Act did not apply because the barrel
had no connection with the premises or the activity; and
because all prior New Jersey cases under the Act had dealt
with natural hazards.92
Such a construction seems clearly inconsistent with
the purposes of the Recreational Use Acts, especially since
the barrel was undoubtedly placed in the river by users of
the riverside park, or carried there by the current. So
interpreted, the Act would only exempt the landowner from
liability for natural conditions, and would thus create little
incentive to open lands to public use, especially when the
landowner is making a concurrent use of the property.
IV.

THE RESERVATIONS

As noted above, the Wyoming Recreational Use Act
reserves two classes of persons from its operation; those
who are willfully or maliciously injured, and those who pay
a charge for use of the land. These will be considered in
order.
A.

Willful or Malicious Acts.

The Act itself contains no definition of the terms willful
or malicious. "Malicious" has, however, been defined in the
89. See, e.g., Gard v. United States, supra note 4, applying the statute to an
abandoned mine tunnel.
90. N. J. STAT. ANN. § 2A-42A-3 (West Supp. 1979), "an owner . . . of
premises, whether or not posted . .. owes no duty to keep the premises
safe for entry or use by others for sport and recreational activities, or
to give warning of any hazardous condition of the land."
91. Sup'ra note 77.
92. Id., at 671.
93. WYo. STAT. § 34-19-105 (1977).
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criminal case law to refer to the intentional doing of a
wrongful act, or a deliberate intent to injure." If the definitions from these cases apply, a plaintiff subject to the
Act would bear the heavy burden of proving that the defendant intended to harm him, which would rarely be the case.
The term "willful" is a greater problem, although
there is a definition of that term in a case under the automobile guest statute: 95
Willful misconduct is the intentional doing of something which should not be done, or intentional failure to do something which should be done, in the
operation of the automobile, under circumstances
tending to disclose the operator's knowledge, express
or implied, that an injury to the guest will be the
probable result of such conduct. It differs from
negligence, even gross negligence, although it may
include gross negligence, and involves a distinct
positive element as distinguished from the merely
negative element of negligence or carelessness. It is
willfully designed to accomplish a specific result,
and is not aimless of purpose or regardless of result.
It is obvious that the operation of an automobile is a
very different endeavor than allowing recreational users
on one's land, for it is an active enterprise where the driver
will be exposing himself to the same risks as his passenger.
It is helpful, therefore, to look at the definitions applied in
cases decided under Recreational Use Acts.
Those cases do not reveal a uniform application. One
case 9 has relied on the Second Restatement of Torts definition of reckless disregard of safety, 7 which does not seem
94. Elliot v. State, 47 Wyo. 36, 30 P.2d 791, 793 (1934), State v. Johnson,
7 Wyo. 512, 54 P. 502, 503 (1898). See also, Nunez v. State, 383 P.2d 726,
729 (Wyo. 1963), defining malicious homicide in the same way.
95. Mitchell v. Walters, 55 Wyo. 317, 100 P.2d 102, 107 (1940), quoting
BLASHFIELD, 4 CYCLOPEDIA OF AuTOMomBLE LAW AND PRACTICE § 2322
(1927).
96. Estate of Thomas v. Consumers Power Co., supra note 12, at 794. On
appeal, the Michigan Supreme Court overruled the appellate court's decision
that there was no jury question of gross negligence, a ground of liability
under the Michigan statute, unlike that of Wyoming. Estate of Thomas v.
Consumers Power Co., 394 Mich. 459, 231 N.W.2d 653, 654 (1975).
97. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 500 (1965).
The actor's conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of
another if he does an act or intentionally fails to do an act which
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to require an actual knowledge of dangerous conditions
nor any particular intent to injure beyond awareness of
facts which would lead a reasonable man to recognize a
risk greater than negligence, or should lead him to recognize
such a risk. Two other courts have diluted the standard
still farther, with a New Jersey county court holding that
the statute in that state creates a simple standard of foreseeability, and an Illinois federal district court holding that
the standard imposes a duty to use care to discover and
alleviate the danger. 9
On the other extreme, a California federal district court
applying Nevada law defined willful so as to require a
design, purpose, and intent to do wrong and inflict the
seems to fit the Wyoming meaning of
injury"9 -which
"malicious." Somewhere between the extremes is that of a
Georgia court of appeals, which requires :1"0
Actual knowledge of the owner that its property is
being used for recreational purposes; that a condition exists involving an unreasonable risk of
death or serious bodily harm; that the condition is
not apparent to those using the property, and that
having this knowledge, the owner chooses not to
guard or warn, in disregard of the possible consequences.
It seems that the definition adopted in Nevada law
could not apply in Wyoming, because it would render the
term "malicious" in the statute superfluous. On the other
hand, mere foreseeability, really just a test of proximate
it is his duty to the other to do, knowing or having reason to
know of facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize, not
only that his conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physical
harm to another, but also that such risk is substantially greater
than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent.
98. Krevics v. Ayars, 141 N.J. Super. 511, 358 A.2d 844, 847 (1976), and
Miller v. United States, supra note 65, at 561-562.
99. Gard v. United States, supra note 4.
100. McGruder v. Georgia Power Company, 126 Ga. App. 562, 191 S.E.2d 305,
307 (1972). On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court found the Act not to
apply because the land was posted against trespassers. Georgia Power
Company v. McGruder, 229 Ga. 211, 194 S.E.2d 440, 441 (1972). The Court
ignored GA. CODE ANN. § 105-405 (1968 Rev.), which is identical to Wyo.
STAT. § 34-19-102 (1977). That section abrogates the landowner's duty to
any recreational user, regardless of consent. The decision would appear to be
incorrect, at least on that ground.
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cause, is clearly too low a standard to be consistent with the
Act's purpose. The Restatement definition would impose a
duty of inspection on the landowner, which is also inconsistent with the purpose of encouraging the owner to open
up his lands, as would the ordinary negligence standard
applied by the Illinois district court. The Wyoming guest
statute case contains elements of knowledge of an unreasonable risk, and a disregard of that risk. The Georgia definition most closely approximates that standard, for no
intent to injure is required, but the owner must know of
the condition, risk, and recreational use. However, the rule
approximates the common law duty of the landowner to
licensees not to create a trap for them," 1 so may be a slightly
higher standard of care than the legislature intended. The
rule should probably be limited to artificial conditions
because natural dangers are more likely to be known by
recreational users, and are probably more expensive to
guard against.
For the defendant, the major concern is whether a
summary judgment may be granted in his favor."' Cases
which have been held to raise a jury question of willfulness
include the stretching of a cable across a motorcycle path,"'
and failure to warn of fluctuations in water levels near a
dock."' The first situation, where the cable blended in with
the surrounding area, would seem to fit any definition of
willfulness except that of Nevada."' The second dilutes the
willfulness standard to one of ordinary negligence, in resistance to a clear statutory mandate.
The Wyoming legal situation most analogous to the
Recreational Use Act, in terms of classifying fault, is the
now unconstitutional guest statute. The statute barred
recovery for injuries except those caused by "gross negligence or wlllful and wanton misconduct of the owner or
101. Loney v. Laramie Auto Co., supra note 28.
102. See Annot., 50 A.L.R.2d 1309 (1956), collecting cases in which summary
judgments have been held proper or improper under reduced standards of
care.
103. Krevics v. Ayars, supra note 98.
104. Miller v. United States, supra note 66.
105. Gard v. United States, supra note 4.
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operator."' 6 Most of the cases dealt with gross negligence,
but the notable fact is that the court did eventually dilute
the standard by ruling that a series of acts of ordinary
negligence could constitute gross negligence." 7 This probably indicates a judicial uncomfortableness with a rigid
statutory standard in cases where the application would
achieve a harsh result. Such an attitude could affect the
application of the Recreational Use Act.
A related problem is whether the contributory negligence of the plaintiff would be a defense to liability for
acts found to be willful or malicious. The general tort rule
is that contributory negligence is no defense to willful,
although there is no
wanton, or reckless misconduct,'
Wyoming case on this point. The courts of other states,
applying Recreational Use Acts, have so held.' This can
lead to anomolous results, as Miller v. United States""
illustrates. In that case the court really applied a standard
of reasonable care in defining willful conduct-in short, an
ordinary negligence test. It then concluded that as to this
"willful" act or omission in failing to warn of fluctuations
in water depth in a river, contributory negligence was no
defense. The Act, in short, backfired. In their attempts to
restrict the operation of the statute courts may find willful
conduct too readily, and yet deny the landowner defenses
he would have at common law even if the plaintiff were
an invitee."'
B.

Charges Under the Recreational Use Act.

Section 34-19-105 of the Wyoming Statutes exempts
recreational users who are charged for entering the land
for the recreational use thereof. One's first reaction would
be to assume that a fee paid at the gate of an area to be
106. WYO. STAT. § 31-5-1116 (1977) ; supra notes 13 and 95.
107. Krahn v. Lameres, 483 P.2d 522,525 (Wyo. 1971).
108. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 426, DOOLEY, supra note 1, at 100.
109. Lostritto v. Southern Pacific Transp. Co., supra note 12, at 909, and Miller v.
United States, supra note 66, at 562.
110. Miller v. U.S., id.
111. Dudley v. Montgomery Ward, 64 Wyo. 357, 192 P.2d 617, 622 (1948):
"It must not be lost sight of that under the law the invitee who accepts
an invitation owes a reciprocal duty to the invitor while on the invitor's
premises to exercise ordinary care to avoid injuring himself."
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used for a defined recreational purpose would remove the
case from the Act.112 Courts have limited the definition of
charge, however.
In Smith v. United States,"' a visitor to Yellowstone
National Park ventured too near a thermal pool, fell through
the crust, and was severely burned. The National Park
Service had not posted the area because it wished to keep
it undeveloped. The plaintiff was fourteen years old and
travelling with his parents, who paid the usual entry fee
14
to get into the park. Under a regulation then in force,
however, persons under sixteen years of age could not be
charged a fee for entry, and therefore the statutory exemption did not apply, the court held, so that the plaintiff was
subject to the Act.
A similar result was reached in Stone Mountain
Memorial Association v. Herrington."I In that case, the
plaintiffs paid a fee at the entrance of the Stone Mountain
Memorial, where plaintiff was later injured in a fall. The
Georgia court held that the statutory exception... (identical
to that of Wyoming) did not apply, for the fee was solely
a parking permit, not an admission charge." 7
Still another example, although perhaps a more reasonable one, is Diodato v. Camden County Park Commission,"'S
discussed above. There the plaintiff was part of a group
which had rented a baseball field from the county, but was
injured diving into a nearby river. The court held that the
exception in the New Jersey statute did not apply, since the
112. In McClure v. Sutter, 63 111. App.3d 378, 20 11. Dec. 308, 379 N.E.2d 1376
(1978), the court (without discussion) did not apply the Illinois Act to a
situation in which a camping fee was paid by the plaintiff's parents,
prior to his drowning in a private lake. Cases in other jurisdictions, discussed below, might dictate a different result, on the theory that the fee
was not for the use of the lake, and that the Act should therefore apply.
113. Smith v. United States, supra note 41, at 1080.
114. The regulation is not cited by the court, and does not appear in Title 36
of the Code of Federal Regulations for the appropriate period.
115. 225 Ga. 746, 171 S.E.2d 521 (1969).
116. GA. CODE ANN. § 105-408 (1969).
117. Stone Mountain Memorial Association v. Herrington, supra note 115, at
522-523.
118. Suprra note 77.
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fee was for the use of the baseball field, and no charge was
made for the rest of the park."'
The Diodato decision is defensible because the park was
open to the public without charge, and only the use of the
ball field required payment. Smith and Stone Mountain are
not so defensible. The fact that a fee is charged on a
vehicular basis can create two difficulties. First, since the
plaintiff's father in Smith paid a fee, the case implies that
only the owner or operator of the automobile is exempted
from the Act by virtue of payment. Second, because fees
are collected on a vehicular basis, it can quite reasonably
be argued that the permit issued therefore is solely for
vehicular use.1"' Since touring a national park falls into the
definition of recreational use under Section 34-19-101(a)
(iii) ("viewing ... scenic . . . sites"), such an interpretation, based on Smith or Stone Mountain, would exempt the
government from all but willful or malicious acts.
Such a result seems clearly incorrect, in view of the
statute's purpose of encouraging private landowners to open
their property to the public. National, state, municipal and
private parks or facilities where fees are charged will be
unlikely to close if held to the common law standards applied
prior to the Act. The definition of a charge under the
statute should reach a situation in which the landowner
derives an economic benefit and impliedly extends an assurance that his lands are safe for visitors.
V.

CONCLUSIONS

It is obvious from the cases cited that the Recreational
Use Acts have introduced a great deal of confusion into the
law. The traditional rules applying to owners and occupiers
were an accommodation of conflicting rights evolved over
time.12' The decision to abrogate these common law classifications was likewise based upon considerations in an evolv119. Id. at 669-670.
120. Barrett, Good Sports and Bad Lands, supra note 4, at 12-13, see 36 C.F.R.
§ 6.1 et. seq. (1979).
121. DOOLEY, supra note 1, at 375-377.
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ing society. 22 The Recreational Use Acts impose an unfamiliar category of entrants on this structure and the
courts have been forced to struggle with them without
adequate guidance.
In Wyoming, it is questionable whether the Act has
been or will be of any great effect. The absence of cases
appealed to the Wyoming Supreme Court is an indication
of the lack of need for such a statute. The vast quantities
of public lands within the state perhaps indicate a lesser need
for private lands to be opened to the public," unlike eastern
states having identical legislation. Moreover, the common
law limitation on liability to trespassers and licensees to
wanton misconduct, coupled with the economic benefit test,
has probably served to create a reduced risk to landowners.
Finally, one commentator suggests that property owners do
not really close their lands to the public out of a fear of
civil liability as much as through a desire for privacy, and
that the real effect of the Acts is to reduce the incentive to
landowners who do open their lands to maintain them.'24
If the legislature does feel that a Recreational Use
Act would be desirable, the present Act could be modified
to serve its purpose. First, the scope of the Act should be
more clearly defined, as to the lands to which it should be
applied. There is probably no policy reason to apply it to
abandoned buildings in an urban area (if any area in
Wyoming can be called urban), since these areas would
122. Rowlands v. Christian, 69 Cal.2d 108, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561, 564
(1968).
a departure from this fundamental principle [duty of reasonable
care] involves the balancing of a number of considerations; the
major ones are the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the
degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the
injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the
burden to the defendant and consequences to the communnity of
imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach,
and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the
risk involved. Id. at 564.
123. The federally owned lands in the state of Wyoming comprise an area
greater than that of the entire state of Pennsylvania. PUBLIc LAND LAW
REVIEW COMMISSION, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND: A REPORT TO THE

CONGRESS 22 (1970). These lands total 30,059,522 acres, or 48.2 percent of
Wyoming's land area. Id., Appendix F.
124. Barrett, Good Sports and Bad Lands, supra note 4, at 26-27.
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most likely only constitute a potential trap for children. The
statute could be limited in application to city parks open
to the public, rural areas, lands bordering public lands,
riverbanks and private lakes, for example. The Washington
state statute is an example of this sort of limitation. 2 '
Second, the terminology used should tie into the common
law scheme, to eliminate confusion. Third, the term "willful" should be more clearly defined, at least as well as it
can be, to offer the courts some guidance. Fourth, the definition of a "charge" should be expanded to apply to any
situation where the payment of a fee as a practical matter
grants access to recreational facilities, even if ancillary to
another use, such as the renting of a campsite near a private
lake or other hazard. The definition should extend to a
situation in which an implied assurance of safety is given,
or where potential economic benefit to the owner justifies
holding him to an ordinary negligence standard of care.
This could be done most broadly by limiting the statute to
common law licensees or trespassers.
In summary, the Recreational Use Act is a piece of
legislation which is unlikely to have any significant impact
on any user of land except one that may confer economic
benefit on the owner. It probably adds little to landowner
protection, and is a great potential source of confusion for
the Wyoming courts. For these reasons, retention of the
Act in its present form should be reconsidered carefully,
especially in view of its genesis in land problems of the
East and Midwest which are not presented in Wyoming.
Michael K. Davis

125. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.210 (Supp. 1978).
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